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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
Michael Nelson petitions for review of the decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, which concluded that he 
had not accumulated the seven years of continuous residence 
in the United States necessary to be eligible for cancellation 
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.  We will deny the 
petition.  
 
I. 
Nelson is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was 
admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident 
on November 3, 1994.  In early 1999, less than five years after 
his admission to the United States, Nelson pleaded guilty in 
New York state court to possession of approximately 16 
ounces of marijuana (―the 1999 conviction‖).   
 
In August 2000, Nelson visited Canada for two days.  
Although his 1999 conviction rendered him inadmissible to 
the United States, Nelson was nonetheless allowed to reenter 
the country through a border checkpoint.  Following his 
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reentry, he did not leave the United States again and lived 
here without interruption.  
 
On November 16, 2006, Nelson was arrested in New 
Jersey after attempting to retrieve a package containing a 
substantial amount of marijuana that had been mailed to a 
Sears Auto Center.  In May 2008, he was tried by a jury in 
New Jersey state court and found guilty of attempted 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 
N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:5-1, 2C:35-5b(10), & 2C:35-7.1 (―the 2008 
convictions‖).  He proceeded to challenge these convictions 
on direct appeal.        
 
On November 26, 2008, the Department of Homeland 
Security (―DHS‖) issued a Notice to Appear asserting that 
Nelson was removable because his 2008 convictions 
constituted aggravated felonies and controlled substances 
offenses pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i).  
The Immigration Judge (―IJ‖) originally found Nelson 
removable based on these convictions, but later withdrew 
those findings after Nelson established that the convictions 
were on direct appeal and thus were not ―final.‖   
 
On September 8, 2009, DHS issued additional removal 
charges based instead on Nelson’s 1999 conviction.  Nelson, 
for his part, subsequently applied for cancellation of removal.  
After finding Nelson removable based on the 1999 
conviction, the IJ denied his application for cancellation of 
removal, concluding that Nelson had not accrued the required 
seven years of continuous residence in the United States 
necessary to be eligible for that relief.  In particular, the IJ 
found that Nelson’s 1999 drug offense triggered the ―stop-
time‖ provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), and ended his 
period of continuous residence short of the seven-year 
statutory threshold.  Furthermore, the IJ determined that 
Nelson was not permitted to start a new period of continuous 
residence based on his reentry to the United States following 
his two-day trip to Canada in 2000.   
 
Nelson appealed to the BIA.  On appeal, Nelson 
conceded his removability based on the 1999 conviction, but 
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argued that the IJ erred in denying his application for 
cancellation of removal for failure to meet the residence 
requirement.  He did not dispute that his 1999 conviction was 
an event that interrupted his continuous residence.  Rather, he 
argued that, based on this Court’s decision in Okeke v. 
Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005), he was entitled to 
establish a new period of continuous residence after his 
reentry to the United States in 2000.      
 
On February 11, 2011, the BIA issued a precedential 
decision affirming the IJ and dismissing Nelson’s appeal.  In 
re Nelson, 25 I. & N. Dec. 410 (BIA 2011).  The BIA 
distinguished Okeke and concluded that ―the clock does not 
start anew simply because an alien departs and reenters the 
United States following the commission of a triggering 
offense.‖  Because the BIA found Nelson removable based 
exclusively on the 1999 conviction, it refused to address the 
2008 convictions or DHS’s claim that Nelson’s direct appeal 
from those convictions had been dismissed.  Nelson 
petitioned for review of the BIA’s decision.     
 
II. 
We have jurisdiction to review the decision of the BIA 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Because the BIA issued its own 
opinion, and did not simply adopt the opinion of the IJ, we 
review only the BIA’s decision as the final agency decision.  
Sarango v. Attorney General, 651 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 
2011).  However, to the extent the BIA deferred to or adopted 
the IJ’s reasoning, we also look to and consider the decision 
of the IJ on those points.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 
F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  We review the BIA’s 
conclusions of law de novo, but give so-called Chevron 
deference to its interpretation of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.  Id. (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 
415, 424–25 (1999)).  ―Under the familiar two-step Chevron 
inquiry, first, if the statute is clear we must give effect to 
Congress’ unambiguous intent, and, second, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, we defer 
to an implementing agency’s reasonable interpretation of that 
statute.‖  De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney General, 622 F.3d 341, 
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348 (3d Cir. 2010).  
 
 
A. 
 
The relevant statute in this case is 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, 
which provides that aliens may be eligible for cancellation of 
removal if they meet certain requirements.  The precise 
eligibility requirements depend on the alien’s status as a 
permanent resident or a nonpermanent resident.  With respect 
to permanent residents, the statute provides that:   
 
The Attorney General may cancel removal in 
the case of an alien who is inadmissible or 
deportable from the United States if the alien— 
 
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence for not less than 
5 years,  
 
(2) has resided in the United States 
continuously for 7 years after having 
been admitted in any status, and  
 
(3) has not been convicted of any  
aggravated felony. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).1   The crucial provision for purposes of 
this petition is the requirement of a continuous seven-year 
residence in the United States.     
 
With respect to the residency requirement, the statute 
contains a section on the ―[t]reatment of certain breaks in 
presence.‖  In particular, it states that ―[a]n alien shall be 
considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical 
                                                 
1
 The requirements for nonpermanent residents are somewhat 
more onerous, although they also must show a continuous 
period in the country—described as continuous ―physical 
presen[ce]‖ rather than continuous ―residence.‖  Id. at § 
1229b(b)(1)(A).   
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presence . . . if the alien has departed from the United States 
for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the 
aggregate exceeding 180 days.‖  Id. § 1229b(d)(2).  More 
importantly for Nelson, however, the statute also contains a 
provision calling for the ―termination‖ of an alien’s 
continuous period of residence, stating:      
 
any period of continuous residence or 
continuous physical presence in the United 
States shall be deemed to end (A) . . . when the 
alien is served a notice to appear under section 
1229(a) of this title, or (B) when the alien has 
committed an offense referred to in section 
1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien 
inadmissible to the United States . . . or 
removable from the United States . . ., 
whichever is earliest.  
 
Id. § 1229b(d)(1).  This section is known as the ―stop-time‖ 
provision of the statute.   
 
B. 
 Both this Court and the BIA have analyzed and 
elaborated on the stop-time provision of § 1229b.  In In re 
Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000) 
(―Mendoza‖), the BIA held that, once an alien’s period of 
continuous presence or residence is terminated by the stop-
time provision—through service of a notice to appear or 
commission of a specified offense—it does not restart, and 
the alien does not automatically begin accruing a new period 
following the cessation of the first one.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the BIA focused on the language and structure of 
the statute, particularly the fact that the service of a notice to 
appear or commission of a crime are said to ―end‖ the alien’s 
period of continuous presence.  The Board contrasted that 
with the provision of the statute identifying events that merely 
―break‖ the alien’s period of continuous presence:   
 
Congress has distinguished between certain 
actions that ―end‖ continuous physical presence, 
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i.e., service of a charging document or 
commission of a specified crime, and certain 
departures from the country that only 
temporarily ―break‖ that presence.  Service of . . 
. a notice to appear is not included as an 
interruptive event under [the statute], which 
merely breaks continuous physical presence.  
Rather . . . such service is deemed to end an 
alien’s presence completely.  Therefore, a 
reading of [the statute] that would allow an 
alien to accrue a new period of continuous 
physical presence after the service of a charging 
document is not supported by the language of 
[the statute]. 
 
Id. at 1240.  Accordingly, the BIA concluded ―that the 
language of [the statute] reflects that service of a notice to 
appear . . . is not simply an interruptive event that resets the 
continuous physical presence clock, but is a terminating 
event, after which continuous physical presence can no longer 
accrue.‖  Id. at 1241 (emphasis supplied).   
 
We have held that the Mendoza decision is reasonable 
and entitled to Chevron deference.  Briseno-Flores v. 
Attorney General, 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007).   
 
C. 
As noted above, Nelson admits that he committed an 
offense in 1999 which triggered the stop-time provision and 
ended his residency period short of the seven-year statutory 
requirement.  Applying Mendoza and Briseno-Flores, that 
residency period, once terminated, would not restart.  Seeking 
to avoid this result, Nelson argues he should be deemed to 
have begun a new period of continuous residence after his 
1999 conviction based solely on his reentry to the United 
States from Canada following a brief trip.  Because the BIA 
ruled against him on this point, Nelson bears the burden of 
showing that the BIA’s decision was either contrary to the 
unambiguous language of the statute, or an unreasonable 
interpretation of the statute.  Nelson has failed to meet that 
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burden here.  
 
1. 
Nelson’s first contention is that the plain language of 
the statute unambiguously provides for a new period of 
continuous residence to begin after an alien exits and reenters 
the country following his commission of a crime.  In 
particular, he relies on the language of the cancellation of 
removal statute stating that a lawful permanent resident must 
have ―resided in the United States continuously for 7 years 
after having been admitted in any status.‖  8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(a)(2) (emphasis supplied).  Nelson argues that this 
language ―makes clear that seven years of continuous 
residence following any admission will be sufficient . . . [and] 
a new admission equals a new period of continuous 
residence.‖  (Petitioner’s Br. at 43.)  Nelson contends that his 
return from Canada in 2000 constituted a new ―admission,‖ 
and thus a period of seven years residence after that admission 
should qualify him for cancellation of removal regardless of 
the fact that he failed to acquire seven years residence after 
his initial admission in 1994.      
 
We disagree with Nelson’s characterization that the 
―after having been admitted in any status‖ language 
unambiguously shows a congressional intent to have the clock 
restart following reentry.
2
  Viewed in context, the language 
                                                 
2
 The parties dispute whether Nelson was in fact ―admitted‖ 
within the meaning of the statute when he returned from 
Canada.  The government argues that he was not admitted 
because his 1999 conviction rendered him inadmissible to the 
country, and an alien’s entry must be substantively lawful in 
order to fall within the meaning of the statute.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13); Gallimore v. Attorney General, 619 F.3d 216, 
224-25 (3d Cir. 2010).  Nelson counters that substantive 
lawfulness is not required.  Rather, he argues that the alien 
need only show that he was allowed into the country after 
inspection, i.e., that his admission was procedurally regular.  
In re Quilantan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 285 (BIA 2010).  We need 
not resolve this dispute here, however, because we disagree in 
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could also be subject to other reasonable interpretations.  For 
example, an alternative interpretation is that the ―after having 
been admitted in any status‖ language simply means that the 
seven-year period need not accrue entirely after admission as 
a lawful permanent resident.  The ―in any status‖ phrase could 
show congressional recognition that an alien may initially be 
admitted to the United States in some other status (e.g., on a 
student visa, as a refugee, or some other nonimmigrant status) 
and receive an adjustment of status to a permanent resident 
sometime later.  Under this interpretation, the statutory 
language merely clarifies that such an alien does not begin 
accruing time towards the seven-year period only after his 
adjustment to permanent resident status.  Rather, the alien 
immediately begins accumulating time following his initial 
admission, regardless of the status.   
 
Furthermore, Nelson’s interpretation of the ―after 
having been admitted in any status‖ language conflicts with 
the plain language of the stop-time provision itself, which 
distinguishes between certain events that merely break or 
interrupt the accumulation of the statutory period (after which 
a new period can restart) and events that terminate or end the 
accumulation of a continuous period.  If Congress had 
intended the clock to restart after every reentry into the 
country, it could have said so explicitly.  Therefore, we cannot 
agree that the statutory language is unambiguous on this 
point.  
 
2. 
 Because the statutory language does not 
unambiguously provide for the beginning of a new period of 
continuous residence following reentry, Nelson can prevail 
only if he establishes that the BIA’s interpretation is 
unreasonable.  If the BIA’s decision is reasonable, we must 
defer to it even if we would have adopted a different reading.  
Yusupov v. Attorney General, 518 F.3d 185, 198 (3d Cir. 
2008).    
                                                                                                             
any case with Nelson’s argument that the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous.    
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 Nelson argues that the BIA’s decision is unreasonable 
because it conflicts with our decision in Okeke v. Gonzales, 
407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005).  In that case, Anderson Jude 
Okeke, a Nigerian citizen, first entered the United States in 
1981 pursuant to a student visa to attend Touro College.  In 
1983, after returning to Nigeria for personal reasons, Okeke 
attempted to reenter the United States and was arrested for 
possession of marijuana.  Okeke pleaded guilty and received a 
sentence of five years probation.  After returning from another 
trip to Nigeria in 1984, Okeke lived in the United States 
without interruption for about 13 years and overstayed his 
student visa.  In 1997, the government served him with a 
notice to appear citing his 1984 entry to the country (not his 
1981 or 1983 entries) and charging him with failing to comply 
with the terms of his student visa because he no longer 
attended Touro College.  Okeke admitted the allegations in 
the notice, but filed an application for cancellation of 
removal.  In the removal proceedings,  the BIA concluded that 
Okeke could not demonstrate the continuous physical 
presence to qualify for cancellation of removal because his 
commission of a controlled substance offense in 1983 
triggered the stop-time provision and no further physical 
presence could accrue after that point.  Okeke appealed. 
 
 On appeal, a fractured panel of this Court disagreed 
with the BIA and granted the petition for review.  Although 
the appeal resulted in three separate opinions, Nelson relies 
exclusively on Judge Garth’s opinion.  Judge Garth rejected 
the government’s reliance on Mendoza—noting that it did not 
address the issue of reentry—and instead relied on In re 
Cisneros-Gonzales, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 2004) 
(―Cisneros‖).  Judge Garth read Cisneros as standing for the 
proposition that, if an alien exits and reenters the country after 
a clock-stopping event, he begins a new period of continuous 
residence or presence.  Therefore, Judge Garth found that 
―[w]here, as here, there is (lawful) reentry after a clock-
stopping event (i.e., the commission of a controlled substance 
offense), the clock starts anew.‖  Okeke, 407 F.3d at 590.    
 
 Although there is language in Okeke that undoubtedly 
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supports Nelson’s argument, we cannot agree that the BIA 
acted unreasonably in refusing to follow the decision in this 
case.  As the BIA correctly noted, the fractured nature of 
Okeke makes it difficult to articulate a controlling rationale 
that could be applied outside the specific facts of that case.  
Even if we were to conclude that Judge Garth’s opinion 
represents the controlling rationale, his opinion was based 
heavily on his interpretation that reentry was the critical fact 
for restarting the clock in Cisneros.  The BIA, however, has 
since rejected that interpretation, and concluded that Cisneros 
―did not announce a broad proposition that reentries, legal or 
illegal, will always restart the clock.‖  In re Nelson, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 410, 414 n.4 (BIA 2011).  The BIA’s interpretations and 
explanations of its own decisions are entitled to deference.     
 
Moreover, Judge Garth himself expressly limited the 
reach of his opinion in Okeke, and noted that he was not 
addressing a case such as Nelson’s:       
 
[T]his case is not about deporting an alien who 
had committed a crime.  The [Notice to Appear 
(―NTA‖)] in this case made no reference to 
Okeke’s alleged commission of the controlled 
substance offense.  The Court expresses no 
opinion as to Okeke’s immigrant status had 
such a charge been made, either when the action 
was allegedly committed or when the NTA was 
eventually filed. 
 
Okeke, 407 F.3d at 590.  Judge Garth emphasized that the 
NTA cited Okeke’s entry into the country in May 1984 (after 
the drug offense) and made no mention of (1) his earlier 
entries into the country in 1981 and 1983; or (2) his controlled 
substance offense in 1983.  Therefore, Judge Garth found: 
―[p]ursuant to the express terms of the NTA, then, it is that 
final [May 1984] entry that should be considered in 
calculating [his] continuous physical presence.  To focus on 
events occurring prior to that time, when the NTA makes no 
mention of them, is both illogical and unjust.‖  Id. at 591 
(emphasis supplied).  Nelson, in contrast, cannot credibly 
argue that it is ―illogical and unjust‖ to consider his 1999 
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conviction when that conviction is explicitly referenced in the 
amended notice to appear.   
 
For all of these reasons, the BIA did not act 
unreasonably in concluding that Judge Garth’s opinion in 
Okeke did not control the outcome in this case.  Rather, the 
BIA’s conclusion that Nelson’s reentry did not restart the 
clock is reasonable.  The relevant portions of the statute are 
completely silent as to the effect of a reentry, save for the 
special rules providing that aliens who depart from the United 
States for extended periods of time break or interrupt their 
period of continuous residence/presence.  8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(d)(2).  If Congress had intended for an alien’s 
departure from the United States to have any additional 
significance, it would have explicitly said so.  Furthermore, 
there is no sound logical justification for attaching such 
significance to departure from the country.  An alien who 
leaves for a two-day trip to Canada after committing a crime 
and lives in the United States for seven years after returning 
has no greater logical claim to be entitled to cancellation of 
removal than a similarly-situated alien who never leaves the 
country.   Accordingly, the BIA’s decision not to make such a 
distinction is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference.      
 
 
